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ABSTRACT 
Standardisation of operating procedures has been 
used in variety of different sectors with the aim of 
achieving more reliable operations hence operational 
safety. Likewise, Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) have been adopted by the maritime sector and 
enforced through the regulatory framework in an at-
tempt to achieve safer shipping operations. Despite the 
fact that regulations enforce the SOPs, it is often ob-
served that during shipping operations these procedures 
are not followed due to various reasons. One of the most 
common reasons for not following the SOPs is because 
shipping companies suffer from poorly designed proce-
dures, which are impractical, unclear or sometimes 
factually wrong. These poorly designed procedures are 
disregarded by crewmembers, which prevent the prac-
tical implementation of these SOPÕs during shipping 
operations. Therefore, it is of key importance that a 
systematic approach is needed to identify and improve 
the current SOPÕs as well as preventing potentially 
harmful workarounds. 
The EU FP7 SEAHORSE project is developing a 
ÒProcedure Improvement SystemÓ which will be active-
ly used by the crewmembers any time anonymously. In 
order to achieve this, over 400 questionnaires have been 
collected from seafarers across Europe where they were 
asked to report on impractical SOPs and common 
workarounds conducted on board ships. These ques-
tionnaires were organised and a risk benefit analysis 
was conducted. This paper will report the initial results, 
as well as demonstrating the overall methodology for 
the SEAHORSE ProjectÕs procedure improvement sys-
tem. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Maritime accident investigations indicate that human 
factors are attributed to most of the accidents. So far, the 
dominant approach taken to overcome and manage this root 
cause of accidents is the development of a set of Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). These SOPs are intended to 
provide a standardised means of working within a given 
organisation and is an attempt to make the system less de-
pendent on human operators. However, to date, the envis-
aged impact of SOPÕs upon safety/accidents has not been 
achieved in the maritime industry. This may be attributable 
to the lack of standardisation between vessels, operations, 
environmental conditions, crew numbers and so on. Due to 
the aforementioned factors, together with poorly designed 
SOPs, it is known that within the shipping industry the 
SOPs do not always match with operational realities and as 
such, seafarers, in some cases, deviate from the SOPs to 
complete their duties. Deviations conducted by crew mem-
bers to overcome a problem or limitation presented by the 
SOPs, are hereby defined as ÔworkaroundsÕ. In some cases 
workarounds can present smarter means of carrying out 
duties; however, they may also result in higher risks. Thus, 
a methodology is required to collect workaround data and 
to inform decision-making about whether to make amend-
ments to the SOP.  
This paper presents a methodology to perform a 
risk-benefit analysis between a SOP and its workaround to 
support decision-making. The methodology can be summa-
rised as follows. Seafarers anonymously submit worka-
rounds in the form of a questionnaire. Seafarers identify 
and provide details of the workaround being practiced 
on-board vessels. To assess a SOP and a workaround, a 
group of experts are asked to rate the workaround based on 
a number of pre-defined attributes. The uncertainty and 
vagueness of the selection between alternatives (SOP or 
workaround) problem leads to the use of the Fuzzy Multiple 
Attribute Group Decision Making (FMAGDM) method to 
provide an assessment of the two alternatives (SOP and 
workaround). This method is employed to compare current 
SOPs and maritime workarounds and provide a value of 
how much better one alternative is over the other. The 
Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS) Method is utilised to find the best alter-
native between SOP and workaround. Results from the 
group of experts are provided to the administrator/decision 
maker. The administrator/decision maker considers the 
outcome of the comparison and a decision is made regard-
ing the workaround. Feedback of the review is provided to 
every member of the organisation, thus closing the loop.  
The methodology was tested on 107 workaround cases 
in a workshop. To date, the methodology has received posi-
tive feedback from experts in the maritime industry and the 
need for a methodology which collects, assesses and sup-
ports decision making in the organisation is clearly required. 
Furthermore, the methodology can also be easily adapted 
and applied in other areas such as the aviation industry. 
 
MARITIME STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
 
Shipping is commonly regarded as one of the most 
dangerous industries in the world and according to the IMO, 
there is the necessity of a set of international regulations to 
be followed by shipping organisations, globally, to improve 
safety. Importantly, the IMO has taken steps to prevent ship 
operators cutting expenditure at the cost of shipping safety 
(IMO 2012). A series of incidents representing significant 
potential impact of shipping accidents is given in 
Hetherington et al. (2006). Most importantly they conclude 
that increased work load and deviations from standards may 
lead to huge repercussions. 
In order to comply with International Safety Manage-
ment (ISM), each shipping company has its own safety 
management system (SMS). SMS is widely used across 
industries to help direct companies to take a systematic 
approach to managing safety within their organisation. 
However, Mearns et al. (2013) recognise that a SMS with-
out a suitable level of organisational culture does not fulfil 
the objective. Bhattacharya (2012) observes that there is a 
significant gap between the mangersÕ and seafarersÕ per-
ceived meaning of the ISM code thus leading to a gap be-
tween the intended purpose of the code and the way in 
which it is operationalised in daily seafaring.  
Mearns et al. (2013) note: ÒÉ safety culture and safety 
management go hand in hand to achieve safe practices in 
an organisation. One is less tangible than the other is, but 
both are required. If there is only an SMS but no real com-
mitment to safety, then the SMS will not be effective, as 
decisions will not really prioritise safety, and the SMS will 
be merely a Ôpaper exerciseÕ. Similarly, if there is a good 
safety culture but no SMS, then in a complex organisation 
the way safety is applied runs the risk of being inconsistent, 
under or mis-resourced, and not seen as business driven 
(because it will not be part of the business plan)Ó. The 
aforesaid highlights that although processes can be formal-
ised within a company, should the company not implement 
these processes properly, they are a waste of time and re-
sources. 
The above provides a basis for the necessity of a con-
tinual review of SOPs within shipping organisations. There 
is a fundamental need that this continual review is partnered 
with a good communication flow. Clearly, there is a need of 
communication between workers and management to dis-
cuss safety aspects and issues within the SOPs. Indeed, the 
involvement of seafarers in the review and development of 
SOPs will increase their respect and adherence to the SOPs. 
However, any rejection of proposed workarounds has to be 
adequately communicated to seafarers in order to avoid loss 
of interest and confidence in the system. 
 
SEAHORSE PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT SYSTEM 
(SPIS) 
 
SEAHORSE procedure improvement system (SPIS) 
aims to develop a comprehensive methodology to capture 
workarounds performed by seafarers within a company, 
assess them and compare them to SOPs in order to find the 
most effective and safe way of working. A small group of 
expert reviewers is assigned by the company to assess the 
workaround and SOP. All assessments are aggregated into a 
result that captures how much better (or worse) a specific 
workaround is than the SOP. These results are then distrib-
uted within the company. SPIS has been embedded in a 
software-based platform to ease the work of the managers 
and improve SOPs in a structured way. 
A general overview of SPIS is shown in Fig. 1. It con-
sists of three main stages: 1) gathering of workaround data 
and development of attributes, 2) ranking and selection of 
alternatives using FMAGDM and TOPSIS and 3) final 
decision-making by administrator and feedback provided to 
seafarer and reviewers. 
  
 
Fig. 1 Overview of SEAHORSE Procedure Improvement 
System (SPIS) 
 
SPIS is a pioneering system that could also be applied to 
other kinds of problems already existing in the maritime 
industry. Additionally, it could also be utilised within other 
domains such as the aviation industry. 
 
Stage 1: Identification and Review of Workaround 
 
The blame culture is still a predominant factor in the 
maritime industry and seafarers are reluctant to share in-
formation about workarounds because they fear of negative 
repercussions (Ek* & Akselsson 2005). A questionnaire 
was developed to anonymously collect appropriate data 
related to the workaround and SOP from the seafarer. SPIS 
questionnaire composed of two distinctive parts: 1) de-
mographics and attitude section and 2) workaround section. 
The structure of workaround section within SPIS question-
naire is shown in Fig. 2.  
To begin with, seafarers are expected to give a brief de-
scription of the SOP from which they deviate, also the par-
ticipant is required to provide a description of the worka-
round being practiced. This is done to provide a written 
account of the alternative means of carrying out the task to 
facilitate reviewers in comprehending and assessing the 
workaround.   
The workaround frequency question aims to identify 
how often a workaround happens amongst seafarers. The 
identification of common deviations is a clear warning that 
a SOP is not being followed, suggesting that there are po-
tential issues with the SOP. At the same time, this question 
also provides insight into whether there may be challenges 
if the workaround needs to be prohibited. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Structure of workaround question within SPIS ques-
tionnaire 
 
It was expected that certain type of operations may in-
cite workarounds, thereby seafarers were expected to iden-
tify it along with the location onboard where such operation 
was being undertaken. There are always several reasons 
why SOPs are not working effectively in the maritime in-
dustry. Therefore, it is vital to capture the reasons behind 
the deviations from SOPs. This allows insight into the sea-
farer and potential issues with the existing SOP. 
Presumably, SOPs are designed to describe the best way 
of working, however, sometimes seafarers may identify 
smarter, more efficient ways of performing the same task 
without compromising safety. The identification of the 
benefits allows the seafarers to express why the worka-
round is being deviated from, showing the positive reasons. 
Naturally, there are possible risks associated with per-
forming the task in the alternative way. In order to gain 
insight into the risks, the seafarers are asked to give their 
own account of the possible risks associated with the work-
arounds. Lastly, any additional information worth consid-
ering for the review of SOP is enquired.  
To summarise, the above questions allow seafarers to 
provide a description of both workaround and SOP along 
with associated information including their perceived risks 
and benefits of performing the workaround. Open-ended 
questions were determined as most suitable for this ques-
tionnaire as it was identified that seafarers would have to 
detail many aspects to allow assessment in the second stage 
of the methodology by the experts. The questionnaire pur-
posely has a limited number of questions to encourage the 
reporting of the workaround and reduce the time required to 
complete the questionnaire. It however does elicit sufficient 
information needed for the subsequent assessment. 
The second aspect of this stage is the development of a 
set of attributes to measure the workaround. Measuring the 
subjects like health, safety and environment is not easy and 
requires some measures to gain insight into company sys-
tems (Groeneweg et al. 2013). The performance of shipping 
companies is typically evaluated by key performance indi-
cators (KPIs). Decision makers need several attributes to 
assess problems and come up with a result. In SPIS, nine 
attributes were selected to evaluate the performance of 
workaround according to safety critical performance drivers. 
An expert workshop was arranged to identify the most 
important attributes for SOP & workaround benchmarking 
process. In that, five attributes were defined as benefits, 
which try to identify advantages of performing a worka-
round. The other four attributes were defined as risks which 
may arise with the implementation of a workaround. The 
list of selected attributes is shown in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3 The list of attributes 
 
Safety is paramount in the maritime domain. In order to 
maintain safety of shipping, many regulations came into 
force including: International Convention for the Safety of 
Life (SOLAS), International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(COLREG), International Convention on Loadlines 
(LOADLINE), The International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS), The International Safety Manage-
ment Code (ISM) International Convention on Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 
(STCW) and lastly, The ILO Merchant Shipping (Minimum 
Standards) Convention (ILO) (ICS 2015). 
Practicality attribute aims to elicit the expertÕs opinion 
whether the proposed workaround may provide more bene-
fits to the practicality of an operation compared to the ex-
isting SOP. Here, practically is Òthe quality or state of being 
practicalÓ. A SOP can be safe, cost effective etc.; however, 
it may not be practical and may induce operational difficul-
ties. Seafaring is known as one of the hardest occupations 
with an excessive workload. Therefore, SOPs and work 
instructions should be prepared in a practical and user- 
friendly way to decrease the workload. 
Time efficiency attribute is meant to establish the ex-
pertÕs opinion whether proposed workaround may make a 
shipping operation more time efficient compared to the 
existing SOP. Shipping companies operate at a very tight 
schedule and need to deliver their cargo in a limited time. 
Due to the long and exhaustive work hours, seafarers some-
times come up with time efficient solutions to ensure they 
have the specified rest hours. 
Cost is a crucial parameter not only in shipping but also 
in other industries. Companies always try to decrease their 
investment or maintenance costs by implementing smarter 
technologies or conducting shipping operations effectively. 
Cost effectiveness can be achieved in a company by utilis-
ing fewer resources such as labour, time or equipment. 
Therefore, companies promote seafarersÕ cost effective 
solutions on daily basis without putting safety at stake. 
Regulatory compliance is essential to maintain safety 
within the maritime industry. Shipping companies put 
enormous effort to comply with international regulations. 
Complying with the rules not only increases the safety and 
reputation of a firm but also protects from costly fines. 
Companies, who are successful at regulatory compliance, 
can avoid catastrophic accidents undoubtedly. The Interna-
tional Maritime Organization (IMO) is known as the big-
gest regulatory body in the maritime industry. The IMO 
made the International Safety Management Code (ISM) 
mandatory after the accident of Herald of Free Enterprise to 
avoid reoccurrence of these accidents (Goulielmos & 
Goulielmos 2005).  
ÔRisk to personÕ attribute aims to extract the expertÕs 
opinion whether proposed workaround may create more 
risks to personÕs health and safety compared to the existing 
SOP. Numerous casualties and injuries occur because sea-
farers do not strictly follow the SOPs and are performing 
risky workarounds. All risks associated to human should be 
eliminated or reduced to a level that is as low as practicable 
on board ships to avoid such circumstances. 
Around 90% of the goods transportation is seaborne and 
shipping is very complex and high risk environment. The 
shipping industry had catastrophic accidents throughout the 
years such as Herald of Free Enterprise, Costa Concordia 
and Deep Water Horizon. Risks to ships should be elimi-
nated or reduced appropriately to avoid occurrences of such 
accidents. A total ship loss with numerous casualties is the 
worst scenario a company can have, therefore, there are 
various detailed SOPs to maintain safety on critical opera-
tions such as fire protection, manoeuvring, etc. A tragic 
accident can also affect companyÕs image negatively and 
may even lead to bankruptcy. Considering the aforemen-
tioned factors above, risk to ship is a very important factor 
that affects SOP development. 
Risk to environment attribute aims to elicit the expertÕs 
opinion whether the proposed workaround may create more 
risks to environment (such as oil spills, gas/chemical waste, 
garbage, etc.) compared to the existing SOP. Once there is 
an oil spill at sea, even though the prompt actions take 
place after these events, the residuals keep contaminating 
the marine environment. Scientists found subsurface oil 
residues twenty years after the Exxon Valdez accident 
(Boehm et al. 2011). Besides the oil spills, emissions of 
CO2 emissions and other wastes also constitutes a great 
threat to the environment. 
Shipping is known as a very complex occupation and in 
order to ease the complexity, the workload is broken down 
into different shipping operations such as manoeuvring, 
bunkering, cargo loading and mooring, etc. Each shipping 
operation require different types of expertise and high de-
gree of situational awareness. It is crucial to consider all 
hazards a shipping operation might have. Risk assessment 
should be carefully conducted in order to address all types 
of risks of a specific operation. 
 
Stage 2: FMAGDM Method for Ranking and Selection 
of Alternatives 
 
In order to compare the workaround and the SOP, SPIS 
has adapted the Fuzzy Multiple Attributive Group Decision 
Making (FMAGDM) method proposed and outlined by 
ler and Odabaşi (2005). This method consists of three 
distinct states, namely (1) the rating state, (2) the attribute 
based aggregation state and (3) the selection state. A visual 
representation of the FMAGDM methodology is shown in 
Fig. 4.  
 
Fig. 4 Overview of FMAGDM methodology 
 
This method leverages reviews by experts, which are 
elicited through an established workaround assessment 
form to provide an assessment of the workaround based on 
a number of attributes. Reviewers/experts are defined as 
individuals with substantive knowledge of a given area. In 
order to identify appropriate experts in the organisation the 
questionnaire completed by the seafarer categorises the 
workaround into one of four operations: deck operations, 
cargo operations, engine room operations and bridge opera-
tions. Experts are categorised as having expertise in one of 
the four categories and experts are internal within the or-
ganisation. Experts are given workarounds to assess based 
on their expertise decided by the administrator. 
 
Table 1 Experts rank the attributes to determine the 
weighting of the attributes 
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Practicality o o o o o 
Time Efficiency o o o o o 
Cost Efficiency o o o o o 
Regulatory Compliance o o o o o 
Safety o o o o o 
Risk to Person o o o o o 
Risk to Ship o o o o o 
Risk to Environment o o o o o 
Risk to Operation: o o o o o 
Other: o o o o o 
 
Experts are firstly asked to rate the workaround with 
respect to each attribute using a Likert-type scale (very 
unimportant, unimportant, neither important nor unim-
portant, important, and very important), thus giving an 
assessment in linguistic terms as shown in Table 1. 
Naturally, each expert has different levels of expertise 
across the attributes (for instance one expert can have more 
knowledge about safety but has less knowledge about com-
pliance). Therefore, it is important to have different 
knowledge levels on each attribute and to utilize heteroge-
neous group of experts in the aggregation. In the aggrega-
tion process, the person calculated as having the most ex-
pertise was weighted as Ò1Ó and others were compared and 
weighted relatively with this person. The linguistic terms 
were converted to standardised trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 
because linguistic terms are not mathematically operable. 
Established conversion scales exist in the conversion of 
fuzzy data to fuzzy numbers (Chen et al. 1992). The con-
version scale used in SPIS is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Selected Scale for Aggregation 
Likert Scale Statements Scale 3 
1. Very Poor  (0, 0, 0.1, 0.2) 
2. Poor  (0.1, 0.25, 0.4) 
3. Fair  (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) 
4. Good  (0.6, 0.75, 0.9) 
5. Very Good  (0.8, 0.9, 1, 1) 
 
The selected experts are asked to rate the workaround in 
a questionnaire format. Experts are required to assess the 
workaround based on a number of predefined subjective 
attributes, these attributes (Table 1) are generic and used for 
all workarounds regardless of their operation categorisation. 
The second state is the attribute based aggregation state. 
Its purpose is to provide an aggregated result for the work-
around. In this state, a score is calculated and assigned to 
each expert for each attribute capturing the expertise of 
each expert that is a potential means of weighting of each 
expert within the analysis. This calculation is performed to 
allow appropriate weighting of the expert opinion and then 
provide robust results and a higher degree of confidence in 
the calculations. The aggregation process of SPIS follows 
the sequence of ler and Odabaşi (2005) and is para-
phrased from their paper:  
Firstly, the degree of agreement (degree of similarity) is 
calculated, this is denoted by S(R1, R2). In this stage, the 
method developed by Chen (1995) is utilised to calculate 
degree of similarity between all possible sets of experts. 
The degree of agreement is calculated as follows: given we 
have the opinion of Expert A who gives in trapezoidal 
number, say � = 	 (�&, �(, �), �∗) and then Expert B who 
gives � = 	 (�&, �(, �), �∗), S(A, B) is calculated as:  
 
� �, �
= 1 −	
�& − �& + �( − �( + �) − �) + �∗ − �∗
4
 
(1) 
 
An increase in S(A,B) corresponds to a higher degree of 
agreement between the experts with a maximum possible 
value of 1. After the calculation of degree of similarity is 
performed between all possible pairs of experts the agree-
ment matrix (AM) is calculated. AM displays the degree of 
agreement between every pair of experts. The diagonal is 
the degree of agreement of an expert with themselves 
therefore values on the diagonal are always 1.  
Average degree of agreement (AA) is then calculated by 
using AM. The average degree of agreement of expert u, 
denoted by �4 is calculated as  
�� �4 =
1
� − 1
� �4, �7
8
79&
7:4
 
(2) 
 
� is the number of experts and �7 corresponds to ex-
pert �, 1 ≤ � ≤ � and 1 ≤ � ≤ �.  
The relative degree of agreement (RA) is next calculat-
ed as: 
 
�� �4 = 	
�� �4
�� �4
8
49&
 
(3) 
 
Consensus degree coefficient denoted by CC(�4)  of 
expert �4 is calculated by  
 
CC(�4) = � ∙ ��4 + 1 − � ∙ �� �4 , 
(4) 
 
�(0 ≤ � ≤ 1) represents the relaxation factor. Natu-
rally, when � = 0 all experts are considered equally and 
this will occur in a homogeneous group of experts. It is 
evident that � acts as a weighting of ��4, which denotes 
the importance of the expert and �� �4 	which is the rela-
tive degree of agreement of the expert. ler and Odabaşi 
(2005) suggest that one way to assign weightings to experts 
is to use a moderator who assigns weights to each expert.  
Lastly, the aggregation results, �DΕ , of fuzzy opinions 
are calculated as 
 
�DΕ = ��(�&)⨂�&⨁��(�()⨂�(⋯⨁��(�8)⨂�8 
(5) 
 
⨁ denotes the fuzzy addition operator and ⨂ denotes 
the fuzzy multiplication operator. 
To summarise, MAFGDM method aggregates the rat-
ings provided by the group of experts for each alternative 
according to subjective attributes. All of expertsÕ ratings for 
each alternative are aggregated according to subjective 
attributes and both attributes and experts are weighted ac-
cording to their importance in the decision-making context 
expertise. 
The third state is the selection state which aims to pro-
vide a ranking of the alternatives. After State 2, all aggre-
gated trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are defuzzied to rank the 
best alternative. Fuzzy numbers are transformed into crisp 
numbers for evaluation by implementing fuzzy scoring 
approach (Chen et al. 1992). Weighting of the attributes is 
considered in this state.  
Finally, TOPSIS is utilized as a MADM method in the 
ranking stage to rank the order of the alternatives. TOPSIS, 
developed by Hwang and Yoon (1981) is well-known with 
its broad acceptability in many problematic areas and effec-
tive for determining best alternatives quickly. The working 
algorithm of TOPSIS is given below (ler & Odabaşi 
2005): 
 
¥! Attribute dimensions are converted into 
non-dimensional attributes in order to benchmark 
the attributes and obtain normalised weightings; 
¥! The normalised decision matrix multiplied with its 
associated attribute weight is done in order to 
calculate weighted normalised ratings. There are 
several methods to calculate the weightings of the 
attributes such as Weighted Evaluation Technique 
(WET), eigenvector method and entropy method 
(ler & Odabaşi 2005). Here, the WET has been 
adopted; 
¥! Positive ideal and negative ideal solutions are 
calculated; 
¥! Separation measures are calculated by Euclidean 
distance; 
¥! Similarities to positive ideal solution are 
calculated; 
¥! Preference order is ranked amongst alternatives. 
 
 
Stage 3: Finalised Results and Feedback of Workaround 
Evaluation 
 
It is recognised that decision making predominantly in-
volves the consideration of more than one criterion or at-
tribute (Pidd 2009). An interesting aspect of research inves-
tigates the way in which people make decisions, and the 
work of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) highlights that 
individuals do not make decisions in a systematic way and 
there are inherent biases in the decision making processes 
of individuals. In the decision making process the decision 
maker has to identify and consider the relevant stakeholders. 
The finalised decision ends up to be a compromise between 
needs and expectations of the different stakeholders identi-
fied and, sometimes, it needs to prioritise the wishes of the 
stakeholders with the most power (Pidd 2009). Indeed, 
decision-making is a challenging task, especially when 
there are varying criteria with which to measure the differ-
ent alternatives. In order to ensure consistency across ex-
perts and facilitate a structured and repeated process of 
decision-making, the expertsÕ judgments are elicited with a 
formalised means based on a questionnaire. This helps 
experts think through the problem based on agreed 
pre-defined attributes. 
In order to allow the decision maker to make a judgment 
on the workaround a summary is provided to the decision 
maker to assist them. The decision maker is provided: a 
written summary of the workaround; a summary of the SOP 
which is being deviated from; a written summary of the 
risks; a written summary of the benefits; the aggregated 
results from the heterogeneous group of experts; a break-
down of the attribute based values from the expertsÕ as-
sessments; a breakdown of the expertsÕ assessments. The 
decision maker is also given associated information about 
the calculation of the score.  
 
Table 3 Guidance Scale (where x denotes the value pro-
duced by the FMAGDM method) 
 
Value of 
Workaround 
Guidance 
0 ≤ � < 0.4 
SOP should be strictly followed. Value 
of the workaround highlights severe 
lack of adherence to key attributes. 
These types of workaround should be 
prohibited.  
0.4 ≤ � < 0.5 
SOP should be kept as a template, but 
the information in the workaround can 
be considered and there is potentially a 
need for improvement in the SOP.  
0.5 ≤ � < 0.6 
Workaround is better but requires dis-
cussion of amendments to SOP.  
0.6 ≤ � < 1 
The workaround should be converted 
into SOP to enhance operational safety 
and meets both the operational realities 
on-board vessels as well as meeting 
desired safety levels.  
 
The communication of uncertain information is a chal-
lenging task and decision-making is also somewhat difficult. 
In order to communicate clearly the results, the information 
is provided in a visual format to enable decision makers to 
better understand the variation between experts as well as 
variation between attribute scores. A generic scale has also 
been developed to assist the decision maker; the scale is 
used to determine which category the result of the expertsÕ 
assessments belongs and provide guidance about the ap-
propriate action for the decision maker to choose, this is 
shown in Table 3 above. The decision maker will formulate 
a decision based on the information. 
 
TEST OF SPIS & INITIAL RESULTS 
 
SPIS was tested in several stages and this section pro-
vides an overview of the various tests performed. 
 
Collection of Workaround Data through Online Survey 
 
The SEAHORSE Smart Procedures questionnaire was 
made available online via (http://seahorseproject.eu/) and 
distributed through partners of the SEAHORSE project. 
This was done so to gain a rich database of workarounds. In 
total, 451 responses were received. The survey is made up 
of two sections, the first section of the survey focussed on 
the collection of attitude data. The second section, pertain-
ing to workarounds, was completed by 295 participants. 
After a careful review/ cleansing of the workaround data, 
107 distinct workarounds were identified. These 107 work-
arounds were identified as one of four operations: deck 
operations, cargo operations, bridge operations and engine 
room operations. The categorisation of the workaround 
assisted when assigning an expert to review the workaround 
in the second stage of the methodology. 
It was noted that, despite asking seafarers to fill out both 
parts of the survey most of them missed workarounds part. 
The reasons for only one part of the survey being complet-
ed is unknown, however, the researchers identified that 
providing a large survey may lead to questions not being 
completed. Therefore, the decision was made that the sur-
vey to be administered to seafarers would only capture data 
about the workaround and some essential demographic and 
attitude data. 
 
Initial Results of Expert Workshop Assessing Worka-
rounds 
 
A workshop was held in Glasgow on March 3rd, 2015. 
This reflects the testing of second stage of the methodology 
where experts are asked to assess the workaround based on 
a predefined set of attributes and an appropriate associated 
Likert-scale. At the workshop 40 experts from both air and 
maritime industry were present, these experts were assigned 
into one of the four groups (deck operations, cargo opera-
tions, bridge operations and engine room operations) based 
on their expertise. 
Due to large in numbers, deck operation workarounds 
were divided into two different booklets while the cargo 
and bridge operations were consolidated as shown in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5 The categorization of the booklets 
 
In all of the working groups, different experts from dif-
ferent backgrounds were distributed equally and each 
working group consists of the given experts below in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Expertise of each working group 
 
Experts were asked to self-assess their expertise in the 
workbook, thus differing a little from the proposed meth-
odology. Nevertheless, this highlights how experts can be 
weighted in an alternative means should a moderator not be 
available. 
The FMAGDM and TOPSIS method were implemented 
in Matlab to allow the assessment of the expert data and the 
outcome of the FMAGDM and TOPSIS were provided. 
 
Even though SOPs are designed to reflect the best way 
of working, our results showed that in many cases the per-
formed workaround is better than actual SOP (Fig. 7). In 
total 23 out of 107 (22%) workarounds were better than the 
actual SOP according to FMAGDM method.  
 
 
Fig. 7 Distribution of better procedure 
 
In the following sample SOPs and associated worka-
rounds, pertaining to each type of operations are presented: 
 
Cargo & Bridge Operations  
 
A sample SOP & Workaround data of cargo and bridge 
operations is outlined in Table 4. Here, as shown in Fig. 8, 
SOP is demonstrating as a better option for the first case 
with the ratio of 0.55 and workaround is showing a better 
option for the second case with the ratio of 0.76. 
  
Table 4 Sample Cargo & Bridge Operations SOPs and 
Workarounds Data  
No 
a. Define the standard 
procedure (If you find it 
easier copy and paste the 
standard procedure) 
b. Define the alternative 
practical way adopted by 
crew to perform same 
operation 
1 
Simple example - there 
are so many checklist for 
each navigational activity. 
This is to be done prior 
commencing the activity.  
The alternative it is filled 
in with tick boxes and 
date only for recording / 
audit purpose. But not 
used as the objective in 
ensuring the actual 
checks have been com-
pleted. 
2 
Completing separate 
checklists for daily 
weekly and monthly tests 
for navigation and com-
munication equipment 
Consolidated checklists 
should be established for 
daily weekly and 
monthly tests for naviga-
tion and communication 
equipment 
 
In the first case, crew members complain about filling 
an excessive amount of navigational checklists while they 
have other commitments. The workaround aims to prepare 
a checklist of a navigational duty before performing the 
actual duty just for the audit purposes. Checklists are very 
crucial for the operational safety and they have potential to 
prevent failures that can turn into catastrophic accidents. 
Even though workaround seems a wise idea, not following 
checklists can lead to the skipping of a crucial step and can 
create a dangerous situation in shipping operations. 
 
Fig. 8 Comparisons between sample Cargo & Bridge Oper-
ations SOPs and Workarounds 
 
Second case is approved as an acceptable workaround 
by the majority of the participants in the workshop. A sea-
farer suggested a consolidated version of navigational 
checklist which can decrease the workload without putting 
safety at stake. Instead of performing a repetitive work, a 
seafarer found a better solution without causing any dan-
gerous situation. 
 
Deck Operation 
 
Table 5, depicts a comparison between the SOP & 
Workaround data. As shown in Fig. 9, workaround is a 
better option for the case 32 with the ratio of 0.66 and SOP 
is a better option for the case 33 with the ratio of 1.00. 
 
Table 5 Sample Deck Operations SOPs and Workarounds 
Data 
No 
a. Define the standard 
procedure (If you find it 
easier copy and paste the 
standard procedure) 
b. Define the alternative 
practical way adopted by 
crew to perform same 
operation 
32 
Final reports are prepared 
At the end of each task. 
Reports will be prepared 
during the business 
work-related tasks. These 
reports are requested 
between 2 -24 hours 
All reports are brought 
into a single report 
33 
Conducting risk assess-
ment for a specific task 
Crew often copy and 
paste risk assessments for 
other tasks - enter only 
'standard' risks and con-
trol measures 
 
 
Fig. 9 Comparisons between sample Deck Operations SOPs 
and Workarounds 
 
 
High workload is a well-known fact in the maritime in-
dustry. In addition to seafarersÕ heavy duties, they are also 
expected to fill in numerous papers for regulatory compli-
ance purposes. Companies can work on this issue in order 
to decrease amount of paperwork, for instance by automat-
ing and collecting the same information just for once. 
Risk assessment is a very crucial task to determine haz-
ardous operations and foresee possible dangers related to 
them. Companies should provide sufficient training ex-
plaining the importance of conducting risk assessments and 
their impact on avoiding accidents and incidents. Copying 
and pasting from previous risk assessment data sheet is too 
dangerous for a shipping company. 
 
Engine Room Operation 
 
Table 6 gives a comparison between the sample SOP & 
Workaround data pertaining to engine room operation. As 
could be seen from Fig. 10, workaround is a better option 
for the case 93 with the ratio of 0.52 and SOP is a better 
option for the case 94 with the ratio of 0.72. 
It is evident from case 93 that some of standard operat-
ing procedures do not comprise the details of a required 
operation. Therefore, crew members ask help from other 
seafarers who have higher ranks. Companies always review 
their operating procedures and update the one which are not 
operable by considering crew memberÕs feedbacks. 
 
Table 6: Engine Room Operation Workaround Data for 
Case 93 and 94. 
No 
a. Define the standard 
procedure (If you find it 
easier copy and paste the 
standard procedure) 
b. Define the alternative 
practical way adopted by 
crew to perform same 
operation 
93 
When carrying out the 
task of checking flexible 
couplings between a 
pump and motor, the 
standard operating pro-
cedures differ in many 
ways to the equipment 
and isolating methods we 
have on-board. They are 
written as a general 
guidelines but do not 
apply specific procedures 
for that unit. 
Common sense, obtain 
information from some-
one in a higher rank. 
94 
During bunker operations 
on large sea-going vessels 
the vessel crew need to 
visit the bunker delivery 
barge (which is at a lower 
height) and check their 
meters or do some paper 
work. After so many fatal 
accidents around the 
world in using mon-
key/embarkation ladders 
for this purpose, many 
shipping companies have 
adopted the procedure of 
using the ship's gangway 
for such operations. 
On some ships the junior 
Engine crew members 
(particularity the rather 
shy ones) are encouraged 
to skip the gangway and 
accept climbing down a 
monkey/embarkation 
ladder! 
 
Fig. 10 Comparisons between sample Engine Room Opera-
tions SOPs and Workarounds 
 
Case 94 demonstrates an unacceptable workaround 
which can create risks for performing the duty. Even 
though the companies advanced procedures and technolo-
gies, utilizing old and risky methods for fun should be 
eliminated and prohibited. The company procedure should 
be followed and the officers encouraging these kinds of 
behaviours should be stopped by the company. 
 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
The role of SOPs within the maritime industry are rec-
ognised as paramount in ensuring safety of shipping. Within 
the aviation industry SOPs have also been adopted and to 
date have had much success. The introduction of SOPs has 
not provided the same level of success as the aviation in-
dustry. Therefore, there is work to be carried out in im-
proving SOPs and it is proposed here that the development 
of SOPs is to be an iterative process. SOPs are to be devel-
oped, then used in daily operations and based on the use 
seafarerÕs provide feedback on SOPs which are being devi-
ated from. From this, it highlights which SOPs may need to 
be reviewed, this process is shown in Fig. 11. 
 
 
Fig. 11: Summary of iterative process of design, imple-
mentation and refinement of SOPs. 
 
A key issue related to SOPs and shipping safety relates 
to the fact that seafarers may choose an alternative means 
of performing a task or operation, thus deviating from the 
SOP. It is assumed that managers in the organisation know 
a proportion of the workarounds being practiced, whilst 
others are unknown. To date, there is no methodology 
which captures workaround data from seafarers, yet the 
benefits and necessity of this are abundantly clear.  
On-going engagement with several shipping organisa-
tions allows the demonstration of the proposed methodolo-
gy, these industry partners explicitly expressed there is a 
significant need for a methodology such as SPIS. Without a 
formalised procedures to capture and assess workarounds, 
risky practices may be carried out in the daily operation of 
ships putting seafarers in even greater danger in their daily 
working life. 
The unique contribution of SPIS is the development of a 
means to collect workaround data from seafarers, the iden-
tification of the key attributes by which to assess worka-
rounds and the assistance provided for the decision making 
process and subsequent communication. It is a well-known 
fact that SOPs have crucial impact on operational safety 
and by utilising the SPIS presented here, companies are 
provided with a structured means for the elicitation of 
workaround data and the assessment of workarounds by 
experts in the organisation. In addition to the seafarer col-
lection of data, the methodology provides a means to bring 
together the assessments of multiple experts to provide a 
value of the extent in which a SOP is better than the work-
around.  
In any case, the use of a workaround indicates an un-
derlying issue in the organisation and even if the SOP is 
judged as the best alternative, decision makers need to 
review the underlying reasons as to why the workaround is 
being practiced. Also the decision making process is sup-
ported by the methodology. The recommendation may be to 
adopt the workaround as it is safer and more effective than 
the SOP. It will also identify risky workarounds which 
should be prohibited for operational safety. Usually these 
highlight an SOP which does not meet the operational reali-
ties on-board vessels, hence a review of the existing SOP or 
the design of a new one might be necessary. 
The methodology was tested during the Glasgow 
SEAHORSE workshop by inviting 40 experts from the 
maritime and aviation industries to attend. The methodolo-
gy received positive feedback on the real need of the pro-
posed approach in the maritime industry as well as on the 
format of evaluation and the outcomes provided. The 
workshop enabled further refinement of the methodology as 
experts identified aspects causing issues in the assessment 
of workarounds. 
The test of the methodology revealed that there are 
some workarounds which are conducted due to limitations 
in the design of the SOP, however the chosen workaround is 
not the best way to address the problem. Even though SOPs 
are designed with the intention of providing the best way of 
working, the results have shown that in many cases, per-
formed workaround is better than actual SOP. In total, 23 
out of 107 (22%) workarounds were identified as better 
than the SOP according to FMAGDM method. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Prevalence of workarounds shows that the maritime in-
dustry still has issues with regards to safety. Good practices 
are required to be turned into formalised procedures while 
bad practices should be eliminated. Identification of work-
arounds may also identify underlying reasons for the work-
around being practiced and this may provide valuable in-
sight into the limitations in the design of the SOPs.  
To conclude, this paper provides a methodology to ad-
dress the existence of workarounds in the maritime industry. 
It provides a structured way to support the identification, 
review and decision making related to workarounds and it 
can be easily transferred to other industries utilising SOPs 
such as the air industry where this gap in knowledge also 
exist. 
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